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The Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces (Spanish: ''Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias''—FAR) consist of ground forces, naval forces, air and air defence forces, and other paramilitary bodies including the Territorial Troops Militia (''Milicias de Tropas Territoriales''—MTT), Youth Labor Army (''Ejército Juvenil del Trabajo''—EJT), and the Defense and Production Brigades (''Brigadas de Producción y Defensa''—BPD). The armed forces has long been the most powerful institution in Cuba and high-ranking generals are believed to play crucial roles in all conceivable succession scenarios. The military controls 60 percent of the economy through the management of hundreds of enterprises in key economic sectors.〔(【引用サイトリンク】title=Challenges to a Post-Castro Cuba )〕〔 The military is also Raúl Castro's base. In numerous speeches, Raúl Castro has emphasized the military's role as a people's partner.〔(【引用サイトリンク】title=The Outlook for Cuba and What International Actors Should Avoid )〕 From 1966 until the late 1980s, Soviet Government military assistance enabled Cuba to upgrade its military capabilities to number one in Latin America and project power abroad. The first Cuban military mission in Africa was established in Ghana in 1961. Cuba's military forces appeared in Algeria, in 1963, when a military medical brigade came over from Havana to support the regime.〔John Williams, (Cuba: Havana's Military Machine ), The Atlantic, August 1988〕 Since the 1960s, Cuba sent military forces to African and Arab countries; Syria in 1973, Ethiopia in 1978, the Cuban intervention in Angola from 1975 to 1989, and Nicaragua and El Salvador during the 1980s. The Soviet Union gave both military and financial aid to the Cubans. The tonnage of Soviet military deliveries to Cuba throughout most of the 1980s exceeded deliveries in any year since the military build-up during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. In 1989 the government instituted a cleanup of the armed forces and the Ministry of Interior, convicting army Major General and Hero of The Republic of Cuba Arnaldo Ochoa, Ministry of Interior Colonel Antonio de la Guardia (Tony la Guardia), and Ministry of Interior Brigadier General Patricio de la Guardia on charges of corruption and drug trafficking. This judgment is known in Cuba as "Causa 1" (Cause 1). Ochoa and Antonio de la Guardia were executed. Following the executions, the Army was drastically downsized, the Ministry of Interior was moved under the informal control of Revolutionary Armed Forces chief General Raúl Castro (Fidel Castro's brother), and large numbers of army officers were moved into the Ministry of Interior. Cuban military power has been sharply reduced by the loss of Soviet subsidies. Today, the Revolutionary Armed Forces number 39,000 regular troops.〔 The DIA reported in 1998 that the country's paramilitary organizations, the Territorial Militia Troops, the Youth Labor Army, and the Naval Militia had suffered considerable morale and training degradation over the previous seven years but still retained the potential to "make an enemy invasion costly."〔Bryan Bender, 'DIA expresses concern over Cuban intelligence activity,' Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 May 1998, p.7〕 Cuba also adopted a "war of the people" strategy that highlights the defensive nature of its capabilities. On September 14, 2012, a Cuban senior general agreed to further deepen military cooperation with China during a visit to Beijing. He said that Cuba was willing to enhance exchanges with the Chinese military and strengthen bilateral cooperation in personnel training and other areas.〔(Cuba and China strengthen military cooperation ) – Armyrecognition.com, September 16, 2012〕 ==Army== In 1984, according to Jane's Military Review, there were three major geographical commands, Western, Central, and Eastern. There were a reported 130,000 all ranks, and each command was garrisoned by an army comprising a single armoured division, a mechanised division, and a corps of three infantry divisions, though the Eastern Command had two corps totalling six divisions. A U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency assessment in the first half of 1998 said that the army's armour and artillery units were at low readiness levels due to 'severely reduced' training, generally incapable of mounting effective operations above the battalion level, and that equipment was mostly in storage and unavailable at short notice.〔Bryan Bender, 'DIA expresses concern over Cuban intelligence activity', Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 May 1998, p.7〕 The same report said that Cuban special operations forces continue to train but on a smaller scale than beforehand, and that while the lack of replacement parts for its existing equipment and the current severe shortage of fuel were increasingly affecting operational capabilities, Cuba remained able to offer considerable resistance to any regional power.〔()〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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